

FIVE POWER DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS (FPDA) AND THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION

Dyah Lupita Sari

**Jurusan Ilmu Hubungan Internasional
Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik
Universitas Pembangunan Nasional "Veteran" Yogyakarta**

Email : dyah.lupita@gmail.com

Abstrak

Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) merupakan institusi keamanan di kawasan yang dibentuk pada tahun 1971 sebagai respon atas tindakan konfrontatif Indonesia terhadap Malaysia dan Singapura. Di era kontemporer, telah terjadi perubahan lingkungan strategis keamanan yang juga membawa perubahan bagi arah kerangka kerja FPDA. FPDA kini menjadi institusi pertahanan yang ingin terus meningkatkan perannya dalam mencapai stabilitas keamanan di Asia Tenggara dengan menyesuaikan dinamika keamanan yang ada khususnya ancaman non-tradisional seperti terorisme, kejahatan maritim, kejahatan siber, bantuan kemanusiaan dan penanggulangan bencana, dan lain-lain. Dengan demikian, FPDA masih tetap relevan hingga saat ini. Dengan mendasarkan analisa pada konsep strategic engagement, tulisan ini membahas mengenai Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) dan perannya dalam strategic engagement di kawasan Asia Tenggara. Metode yang digunakan adalah metode kualitatif dengan pengumpulan data sekunder. Argumen dalam tulisan ini menekankan bahwa peran strategic engagement FPDA diimplementasikan melalui: 1.) latihan militer gabungan negara-negara anggota mitra melalui Bersama Shield dan Bersama Lima; 2.) pengaturan dalam FPDA dapat menjadi pelengkap bagi forum regional di ASEAN, contohnya melalui ADMM dan ADMM Plus.

Kata kunci: Five Power Defense Arrangement, strategic engagement, kerjasama militer, Southeast Asia

Abstract

Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) is a regional security institution formed in 1971 in response to Indonesia's confrontational actions against Malaysia and Singapore. In the contemporary era, changes in the strategic environment also affect changes in the FPDA framework. FPDA is now a security institution that wants to continue to increase its role in achieving security stability in Southeast Asia by adjusting existing security dynamics, especially non-traditional threats such as terrorism, maritime crime, cybercrime, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, and others. As such, FPDA is still relevant today. Base the analysis of the concept of strategic engagement; this paper discusses the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) and their role in strategic engagement in the Southeast Asian region. The method used is a qualitative method with secondary data collection. The argument in this paper emphasizes that the role of FPDA's strategic engagement appears on the agendas: 1.) joint military exercises of partner member countries through Joint Shield and Bersama Lima; 2.) arrangements in FPDA can be complementary to regional forums in ASEAN, for example through ADMM and ADMM Plus.

Keyword: Five Power Defense Arrangement, strategic engagement, military cooperation, Southeast Asia

INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy is a fundamental instrument for a country to establish and maintain good relations with other countries in the international order. Diplomacy is an inseparable part of foreign policy, and thus, through its foreign policy, the state is expected to be able to create a pleasant atmosphere during the ongoing conflict. Defense diplomacy is part of the diplomacy policy. The purpose of defense diplomacy is to establish good relations with former adversary countries and countries that have the potential to become enemies or threats, called strategic engagement (Cottey & Foster, 2004). Therefore, defense diplomacy used as a tool of the state's foreign policy to achieve security and prevent potential threats or conflict. In this contemporary era, security threats are no longer limited to traditional issues, but also non-traditional issues (health, climate, environment, economy, terrorism, transnational crime) (Singh & Tan, 2011). These issues make the security agenda broader in defense diplomacy. States finally realize that engaging in multilateral or bilateral diplomacy is a need to promote their national interests (Singh & Tan, 2011).

In Southeast Asia, defense diplomacy has been carried out by countries, especially ASEAN members, aimed at maintaining stability and security in the region. The number of defense diplomacy carried out in the Southeast Asian region is very relevant to see this region as conflictual. Emmers said that the complexity of the security architecture in Southeast Asia includes bilateral military arrangements to multilateral security cooperation, such as within ASEAN. The multilateral defense coalition that also plays an important role is the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA). FPDA itself has members from Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Although Britain, New Zealand, and Australia are not Southeast Asian countries, FPDA has been part of the Southeast Asian security environment since 1971 and still exists today. According to Emmers, the benefits of FPDA are to add considerable flexibility and complementarity to the security framework in Southeast Asia (Emmers, 2011). This research aims to explain FPDA and its role related to strategic engagement in the Southeast Asia region.

Five Power Defense Arrangements

The complexity of security problems in Southeast Asia during the Cold War pushed western countries and the USSR to spread the influence of liberal and communist ideologies. Southeast Asia is used as an arena to get support from countries that are just free from colonialism. Likewise, what happened in Malaysia and Singapore, which is the British Commonwealth. As a new country, Malaysia and Singapore are still unable to defend themselves, especially after the period of the communist rebellion called "Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) (Guan, 2011). Besides, threats also came from Indonesia, which confronted Malaysia in 1963-1966 (Thayer, 2007). The British then issued an "East of Suez" policy and would withdraw their forces in East Suez in

1971. Indonesia's confrontational actions caused uncertainty and increased tension in the region, especially for Malaysia and Singapore, which were very vulnerable to threats (Kian, 2011). These conditions encourage Malaysia and Singapore to cooperate in the field of defense with other countries to obtain the needed security. England, as a former colony, has become a country that has participated in efforts to protect its Commonwealth. Added by New Zealand and Australia which had already established security cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore through Australia, New Zealand and Anglo-Malaya (ANZAM).

In 1971, Five Power Defense Arrangements were formed to replace the existing security arrangement, the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement (AMDA) of 1963. The inseparable defense of Malaysia and Singapore eventually led to the formation of an FPDA approved by Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (ANZUK) (Kian, 2011). In this arrangement the five countries vowed that in relation to the external defense of Malaysia and Singapore, in the form of armed attacks organized or supported externally, or the threat of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore, their governments would immediately consult together to determine what actions should be taken — or separately related to the attack or threat (Wah, 1983). Britain's involvement as one of the great powers of course also has an interest in the region to secure its commonwealth state and stem communist influence in its commonwealth.

FPDA itself is not a defense alliance, but only a consultative forum that contributes to regional security. Australian Defense Officials argue that FPDA is a multilateral arrangement that has an operational dimension in Southeast Asia (Thayer, 2007). FPDA has three main pillars. First is the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) which is responsible for maintaining Malaysian and Singapore air defenses. The second pillar is the FDA developing as a reliable infrastructure for the military-political consultation of its member countries. For this second pillar, a Joint Consultative Council (JCC) was formed, as a regular consultation forum at the senior official level, and the Air Defense Council (ADC), which is responsible for the functions of the IADS. The third pillar is a joint training program implemented through the Exercise Scheduling Conference (ESC), which has the responsibility to monitor and coordinate all activities related to FPDA's non-air defense (Bristow, 2005).

From these pillars, FPDA focuses on maintaining Malaysian and Singapore air defenses as well as being a consultation forum for member countries in dealing with security issues in the region. Although FPDA was born during the Cold War and moves to maintain the security of the British Commonwealth, in its development in the contemporary era, FPDA still exists for more than 40 years. Because the implementation of FPDA takes place in the Southeast Asian region, FPDA and security dynamics in Southeast Asia are interconnected. FPDA continues to expand its focus in responding to the development of security problems that exist in Southeast Asia. Like the tensions that occur in the South China Sea, FPDA responds by holding a

series of Air Defense Exercises (ADEXs) each year and holding joint military exercises to meet the emerging conventional and unconventional security. The intended non-conventional security is like a guide in establishing the development of exercises in the fields of counterterrorism, anti-piracy, humanitarian assistance, and disaster management (Thayer, 2012).

Based on the description above, scholars have reviewed in their writings, the debates that have arisen about FPDA. Some literature studies that examine the debate in FPDA are divided into two: (1) strategic studies; and (2) regional studies. Strategic studies emphasize the relevance of FPDA based on historical context to the current security dynamics. The study emphasizes the evolution of FPDA, which has a strategic significance to the FPDA's interest (Tan, 2008). FPDA sees a change in the strategic context to deal with the uncertainty of threats from the presence of American troops in the Philippines. Besides, FPDA can collaborate in completing the framework of security cooperation with ASEAN. (Wah, 1991). FPDA then increased the role of security in ARF, bilateral intra-regional military relations, and defense relations with the United States (Bristow, 2005).

The regional studies emphasize the security situation in the conflictual Southeast Asia region as an arena for the development of the existence of FPDA as a regional security institution. This dynamic can be observed by examining how the complexity of regional security affects the existence of FPDA (Pratama & Candra, 2014). The complexity, then, gave rise to various responses from countries in the region, especially Indonesia. To offset possible threats, Indonesia tends to respond by examining the potential for coalition formation, strategic partnerships, and regional security communities (Montratama, 2015). Meanwhile, New Zealand sees the existence of FPDA in the region as an instrument to enhance New Zealand's commitment to security in Southeast Asia by contributing to regional security arrangements (Sinclair, 2013). More broadly, the United States, as a superpower country, also sees the existence of FPDA as an opportunity to increase dominance in Southeast Asia through British influence (Chua, 2016).

From the debate that emerged through these studies, in the end, we can take lessons; strategic studies look at how relevant FPDA is in responding to uncertain security dynamics. The dilemma of potential new threats that might arise prompted FPDA to increase its strategic role as a security institution. FPDA does not only exist in the face of real threats, especially for Malaysia and Singapore but also as a deterrent to future threats. Thus, strategic studies see FPDA as still relevant to respond to the current security situation. Meanwhile, regional studies tend to emphasize the influence of FPDA more broadly in the region. In this case, FPDA can be seen as a threat and security institution simultaneously, as well as how countries respond to the existence of FPDA. It also cannot be separated from the United States, which also has interests through FPDA because Southeast Asia is a region that is considered to be very strategic. From the elaboration of the

literature studies, there are no academics who discuss how FPDA can have a role in strategic engagement as part of defense diplomacy in conflict prevention in the region, given that Southeast Asia is a conflictual region.

This paper addresses the question of the role of the FPDA's strategic engagement in the context of defense diplomacy in the Southeast Asia region. This paper will elaborate on the concept of strategic engagement in the framework of defense diplomacy presented by Cottey and Foster as a basis for thinking in analyzing the phenomenon under study. The second part will explain the FPDA in the framework of strategic engagement through military cooperation. In the end, this paper will explain FPDA as a complement to regional forums in Southeast Asia Region.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Strategic Engagement in Defense Diplomacy Framework

Defense diplomacy as an idea to improve security stability has developed since the end of the Cold War. This pattern of change is manifested in the increased use of military cooperation and military assistance in building relations with former enemy states and countries that have the potential to become threats (Cottey & Foster, 2004, p. 15). In terminology, defense diplomacy emphasizes non-confrontational armed forces cooperation and related infrastructure as instruments in broader foreign and security policies (Cottey & Foster, 2004, p. 6). This understanding implies that countries more emphasize the soft power approach in responding to security dynamics and threats that occur in the region. Thus, the role of the military can not only be seen traditionally as an instrument of the use of force to threaten other countries as well as the use of coercive diplomacy in achieving the national interests of a country. In responding to uncertainties in the contemporary era, defense diplomacy is deemed necessary to minimize disputes, improve good relations, prevent conflicts with potential enemies, and increase trust between nations. Thus, defense diplomacy also focuses on the critical role of the Ministry of Defense and defense attache in conflict prevention efforts.

The implementation of defense diplomacy can be realized through several agendas including enhancing bilateral and multilateral relations between civil defense officials and senior military officials; Appointment of defense attache to foreign countries; Bilateral cooperation agreements; Training for foreign civil and military personnel; Provision of advisors and experts on democratic civil control of the armed forces, defense management and military-technical fields; Exchange between personnel and military units; Placement of liaison officers in the defense and military formation of partner countries; Training team placement; Provision of military equipment and other material assistance; Bilateral or multilateral military training (Cottey & Foster, 2004, p. 7).

Meanwhile, more specifically, defense diplomacy also has mechanisms in establishing cooperation through a strategic engagement mechanism that included military cooperation as a means of building mutual trust between countries. Countries then undertake military cooperation as an instrument to show transparency about a country's military capabilities to reduce security dilemmas. Besides, military cooperation serves to strengthen the perception of the shared interests of member countries. It supports specific and concrete defense reforms in member countries. Not only military cooperation, but military assistance is also needed as an incentive to encourage cooperation in other fields (Cottey & Foster, 2004, pp. 15-17).

Defense diplomacy, then, is seen as a mechanism that is quite relevant in dealing with uncertainty in the dynamics of the strategic environment. The country sees that the use of soft power will have more impact compared to the use of hard power, especially for third world countries. The use of force is then projected to deal with more real threats such as territorial conflict that could threaten the country's sovereignty. Likewise in the implementation of FPDA as a defense institution that has a role in strategic engagement, it does not exist as part of a defense alliance to threaten countries in the region but tends to play an active role in conflict prevention in the region. In this case, strategic engagement is also not an arena for contestation that is limited to great power relations but also becomes a trend for other countries, especially Third World countries in establishing good relations with former adversaries.

This paper uses a qualitative method in analyzing the role of FPDA in strategic engagement in the Southeast Asian region. The data collected comes from secondary data in the form of books, journals, reports, and other literature, which are relevant to the phenomenon. By emphasizing the analysis based on the concept of qualitative strategic engagement, this article will be able to provide a clearer picture of what roles have been implemented by FPDA in the nearly five decades of existence in the Southeast Asian region.

DISCUSSION

The Five Power Defense Arrangements in the Contemporary Era

Historically, FPDA's role in defense diplomacy in the Cold War era referred to deterrent efforts for Malaysia and Singapore over Indonesia's confrontational policies in the region at that time. Both countries need security guarantees for the risk of external aggression. In the consultative framework of FPDA it is said that "In the event of any form of armed attack externally organized or supported, or the threat of such attacks against Malaysia or Singapore, the governments would immediately consult together for deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attacks or threats (Ho, 2011). It shows that there is an effort to balance the power of Malaysia and Singapore by forming joint defense institutions with the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in blocking the strength of Indonesia.

In decades, there has been a shift in the strategic environment in the region, making the relevance of FPDA questionable. Indonesia, as the largest country in the region, is no longer a source of threat. The shift of Indonesia's security policy after the Soekarno era made Indonesia no longer use assertive actions in achieving its interests. As the largest country in the region, in territorial disputes, Indonesia also chose to become a non-claimant state among the conflicting countries. Meanwhile, other ASEAN member countries are good partners for Malaysia and Singapore (Huxley, 2017). FPDA then maintains its existence in the region. The contestation of two great powers - China and America - made the role of FPDA still needed in ensuring the security of external forces. The role of FPDA can prevent the threat of the rise of China as a new power in the region and policies that tend to be confrontational. On the other hand, the projection of American power in Southeast Asia also remains a threat amid policy uncertainty in the President Trump era (Huxley, 2017). With this, contestation automatically pushes countries to improve their military capabilities even though ASEAN still has an active role in creating regional security stability.

In response to this shift, the FPDA framework was then designed to respond to security issues that could pose potential threats to partner countries. The emergence of the threat of terrorism, cyber threat, and the rise of asymmetrical warfare are new challenges for FPDA member countries (Daga & Torode, 2017). The Australian Defense Minister 2015-2018, Marise Payne, confirmed that FPDA must be responsive to a very dynamic and challenging regional strategic environment. Singapore's Defense Minister, Ng En Hen, also emphasized that FPDA must continue to renew its relevance through exercises and integration of new capabilities to respond to changing security environments including counter-terrorism and maritime security (Daga & Torode, 2017). Besides, the current trend of conflict is no longer limited to the state to state conflict but also the state against non-state actors. As a result of globalization, non-state actors increasingly increase their existence to pursue their political interests. Terrorist, insurgent, and violent non-state actors groups are currently the most real threats.

The FPDA framework is also an instrument for British and Australian involvement in the Asia Pacific. Britain and Australia have the same roots in forming strategic perspectives and policy values which can then reflect the common perception of the two countries. Australia itself has allied with America and has made this alliance the basis of Australia's security relations. Nevertheless, British involvement in the region is essential to reduce the negative consequences and shift the distribution of power where America has reduced its forces in the Asia Pacific Region, while China is increasingly increasing its power. Through FPDA, the UK played an active role by encouraging coordination measures in FPDA regulation by increasing operational training and gathering of new troops (Huxley, 2017).

From the description above, it cannot be denied that the shift in the strategic environment in the region has an impact on the existence of FPDA. FPDA, which has always been synonymous with post-Cold War security, has then adapted its role and interests to contemporary security dynamics. The existence of FPDA also adjusts the security architecture in Southeast Asia. Although it can be said to be quite stable, it cannot be denied that there are still tensions between countries involved in territorial conflicts, especially in the South China Sea. Therefore, bilateral and multilateral security cooperation mechanisms are needed as a foundation to create security stability. In this case, FPDA has a role in forming minilateral coalitions which ultimately affects security cooperation in Southeast Asia.

Military Exercise within the Strategic Engagement Framework

Cottey and Foster, in their ideas, highlighted the implementation of defense diplomacy, which is a mechanism in forming cooperation and conflict prevention, including a strategic engagement mechanism. In the Strategic Engagement mechanism, Cottey and Foster stressed several essential points regarding military cooperation. One form of military cooperation implemented by FPDA is joint defense training in the air, land, and sea. In the first decade of its formation, FPDA had conducted military cooperation in the form of simple Synthetic Air Defense Exercises (SYNADEXs) air defense exercises scheduled to be held annually with the approval of the JCC. Also, there is the primary air defense exercise called the Air Defense Exercise (ADEX). FPDA also conducts the Lima Bersatu exercise, which is the largest combined air defense and maritime exercise (Thayer, 2007, p. 85). In its routine implementation, ADEX was later expanded gradually by combining ground and maritime exercises. The first land and maritime exercises are called Platypus Exercises and Starfish Exercises which are also routinely held to include elements of prevention against underwater and electronic warfare (Han, 1998).

Starfish exercise is the largest and most complex exercise because it combines three dimensions of war, namely land, naval, and air. Then in the 1990s in the Five Powers Defense Arrangements Ministerial Meeting (FDMM) held in Kuala Lumpur, decided that the focus of the FPDA which was originally purely air defense training shifted to a joint exercise in which the exercise gave a more significant role to land and naval exercises (Kian, 2011). Thus, the combination of ADEX and Starfish was renamed STARDEX so that it did not overlap (Thayer, 2007, p. 86). The Defense Ministers of the FPDA member countries then undertook a major transformation by increasing the operational capability and interoperability of the FPDA forces. FPDA then restructured IADS from the Integrated Air Defense into an Integrated Area Defense System intending to unite military networks throughout the region (Thayer, 2007, p. 86). The IADS framework, which then continued to

exist until the 21st century, continues to provide an essential role in maintaining regional stability by continuing to encourage FPDA countries to increase their defense capacity.

Another transformation was the introduction of a series of Bersama Lima exercises in response to 9/11 tragedy which had a very significant impact on the changing dynamics of global security. The threat is no longer from conventional forces, but also asymmetrical threats from non-state actors. Thus the FPDA Defense Chief focuses the framework in dealing with unconventional issues, including terrorism, maritime crime, smuggling, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Thayer, 2007). Bersama Lima itself is a joint operation focused on dealing with multi-threat scenarios. The exercise aims to increase regional ties and the interoperability of the defense forces of other FPDA member countries by combining land, naval, and air dimension.

In 2010, as a marker for the 40 years of FPDA's existence, FPDA initiated a Bersama Shield exercise aimed at increasing ties with countries in the region and is a long-term implementation for Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in regional capacity building in Southeast Asia. Bersama Shield also aims that defense forces in member countries have the same perception regarding operating procedures, both air and maritime, protection of the marine environment and disaster relief management. At the inaugural event, Bersama Shield was attended by more than 59 fighters, 19 warships, and 2500 manpower (Royal Australian Navy, 2015). Joint exercises Bersama Shield and Bersama Lima are routinely carried out to continue to tighten engagement among member countries. These agendas as evidenced by the activity of Australia in its commitment in the region by continuing to send members of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) in every Joint exercise held. In each joint training event each year, Australia participates in sending an ADF of approximately 300-500 manpower. At the 2013 Bersama Shield exercise, Australia was also the only country to send submarines to support the exercise. At the Bersama exercise in 2018 held in Singapore, the exercise was also attended by 3000 personnel, 14 ships, one submarine, three diving teams, 58 aircraft, five Five-Ground Based Air Defense units, five platoons of ground troops, and various supporting elements from the five FPDA member countries (Singapore Ministry of Defense, 2018). The military exercise agenda routine shows the consistency of FPDA in holding joint exercises as a form of commitment to achieving regional security.

Bersama Shield, in the long run, can continue to exist until now as a routine agenda of the defense forces training member countries of FPDA. Military exercises organized by FPDA are a form of military cooperation for FPDA member countries. Military training, in this case, is not used as a projection of threats to other Southeast Asian countries. The Rear-Admiral Exercise Director, Edwin Leong, emphasized that the exercise had a role in maintaining regional security stability in an increasingly complex security environment.

As such, FPDA requires a joint training mechanism in dealing with non-traditional security challenges by expanding its focus to cover fields such as HADR, maritime security, and anti-terrorism. Besides, Bersama exercise is also needed to strengthen military cooperation among member states (Singapore Defense Ministry, 2018).

Based on the concept of strategic engagement, military cooperation is needed in building the capacity of mutual trust between countries and establishing good relations with countries that could be a potential threat. In this case, FPDA has functioned as a security institution that held build mutual trust and transparency in the military capacity of each member country. This was confirmed by 2018 Malaysian Defense Minister, Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein, who stated that:

“The FPDA has built trust and enhanced interoperability among the militaries of member-nations, promoted respect for international law, and contributed to peace and security in the region.” (Hussein, 2017)

The statement further strengthens the idea that the existence of FPDA is not a threat on a regional scale, but rather to play an active role in the development of a more stable strategic security environment in Southeast Asia (The Star Online, 2017). It was also reinforced that the FPDA was present not as an alliance, but rather a security institution that continued to be relevant in dealing with contemporary security issues. Welcoming 50 years of FPDA's existence in 2021, the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue which was a meeting of Ministers and held on 1 June 2019, reaffirmed that through FPDA, member countries had increased transparency commitments to build constructive arrangements for creating peace in the area. The Ministers also noted that there was significant progress in interoperability built up through the JOINT FIVE and BERSAMA SHIELD exercises (Zhang, 2019).

Not only building cooperation capacity exclusively among FPDA member countries, but FPDA also holds trilateral or multilateral meetings with other countries in the Southeast Asian region. In 2017, Indonesia, through the Ministry of Defense — represented by the Vice Admiral TNI Dr. Widodo - held a trilateral meeting with Malaysia and Singapore that discussed FPDA. Indonesia, in this case, supported the joint FPDA training event and stressed that the exercise had made a positive contribution to the stability of security in the region by increasing operational capacity and capability for the defense forces. Indonesia also emphasized that the joint exercise of FPDA was not a threat to Indonesia. Indonesia is an observer in the Bersama exercise organized by FPDA and states that these activities can increase mutual trust between countries in the region (Caroline, 2017).

From the description above, the function of forming observers - observer members are other Southeast Asian countries outside FPDA members - is to observe the course of the exercise as an effort to promote transparency and trust. Thus, strategic engagement has been implemented by FPDA through

military cooperation, namely by holding military exercises consistently to date, namely Bersama Shield and Bersama Lima. With the implementation of military cooperation in the form of joint exercises, countries will have more transparent mechanisms for managing differences and strengthening the perception of shared interests among members. With joint exercise, FPDA has concretely supported defense reform for member states.

The Role of FPDA in Complementing Regional Forums in ASEAN

In the process of strategic engagement, defense diplomacy works by emphasizing the spectrum of military involvement in various ways and operating systems at different levels as an effort to prevent conflict. In the Southeast Asian region, the practice of defense diplomacy has been implemented and maintained to provide a global picture of the prevailing security architecture. The state then conducts diplomacy practices to build cooperation both bilaterally, multilaterally, and by collaborating with external forces in responding to existing threats (Gindarsah, 2015). In this regard, ASEAN has dialogue partners who are not ASEAN members to promote multilateral security cooperation in responding to contemporary threats. ASEAN already has a forum to involve partner countries in regional forums such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. These forums later became a bridge for FPDA to take an active role in the efforts of strategic engagement with ASEAN member countries. Moreover, Australia has a strategic partnership with ASEAN.

In a multilateral framework, FPDA is a complement to ADMM and ADMM Plus, which is a dialogue of security cooperation in ASEAN countries and also outside ASEAN for non-traditional security issues. ADMM and ADMM Plus do not have a mechanism to hold joint exercises and only concentrate on security cooperation to build confidence, dialogue, and conflict prevention to maintain good relations between countries in the region and improve the climate of relations in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, FPDA complements ADMM by offering defense components that are still lacking in ADMM. In the field of humanitarian assistance and disaster management, for example, FPDA is far superior to ADMM (Emmers, 2011, p. 3). Meanwhile, in ADMM Plus, the role of FPDA is seen by increasing security cooperation between member countries both from ASEAN and outside ASEAN. However, in the process, ADMM Plus still faces challenges due to the centrality of ASEAN, which allows the ADMM Plus program on common issues to be rejected by some members. While in FPDA, members have formed a strong bond. Thus, the trust will continue to increase and affect the increasingly close security cooperation between member states despite involving external parties. Although several challenges must be faced, ADMM-Plus has opened the way for security cooperation with ASEAN dialogue partner countries. ADMM-Plus has formed six Experts' Working Group (EWG) in discussing

maritime security issues. Australia and Malaysia from 2011 to 2014 were the chair of the EWG. In its formation, EWG successfully held the first maritime security tabletop exercises in 2012. In 2013, EWG also held joint practical exercises in humanitarian and disaster relief, military medicine, anti-terrorism and maritime security which all members of ADMM-Plus (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, joined by 2019).

In a bilateral framework, it can be seen from the Australia-Malaysia cooperation relationship in dealing with non-traditional security threats. Since 2002, Australia and Malaysia have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in combating international terrorism (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003). Besides, the signed MoU includes cooperation in Maritime Security in 2011 and combating transnational crime in 2014 (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019). The year 2014 was also momentum for cooperation in disaster management in the loss of MH370 aircraft. In this case, the Australian government sent assistance in the search for aircraft by establishing the Joint Agency Coordination Center (JACC) to continue coordinating the flight of aircraft which is the largest and most complicated flight in the history of aviation (ABC News, 2014).

Emmers also analyzed the bilateral framework through Malaysia and Singapore's relations with the United States. Malaysia feels that the presence of the United States in the region is needed to maintain security stability. While Singapore feels that the presence of the United States in the region is also crucial for Singapore's own security (Mak, 2004), in this case, it can be seen that the US security relationship with Malaysia and Singapore has the same function as FPDA, namely to enhance their external defenses in the changing strategic context of the region. Meanwhile, the US presence did hamper FPDA's military training because of overlapping mechanisms in counterterrorism and anti-piracy matters. However, arrangements in FPDA also complement the US bilateral network with a different approach, because, in FPDA, the security of Malaysia and Singapore has been defined as inseparable. Furthermore, FPDA has succeeded in completing the US network by providing Singapore and Malaysia a way to maintain and deepen bilateral relations with Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand (Emmers, 2010, p. 14).

In the minilateral security structure, FPDA completes The Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) which is a naval patrol and coordination involving Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to improve maritime security in the Malacca Strait. FPDA also conducts military exercise in non-traditional security fields which also includes maritime security. This exercise overlaps with the objectives of the MSP, but FPDA can be a complement to the MSP. First, it relates to the level and intensity of military collaboration. In the MSP, there are still obstacles due to mutual distrust and gaps in capability naval in each country. However, within FPDA, the training in maritime security continues to develop significantly in the face of challenges. Besides, the joint exercise also

increased professionalism and capacity in dealing with maritime security issues (Boswood, 2007). FPDA is considered more diplomatic than MSP (Emmers, 2010). Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in the MSP are still in trouble with the principle of non-intervention in ASEAN, thus hampering assistance in securing maritime areas on the border when the piracy perpetrators cross the borders of other countries. Besides, MSP tries to avoid external interference from great power. While in FPDA, external forces such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are involved in securing maritime areas in the Malacca Strait.

The Southeast Asian region itself cannot be separated from external influences such as great powers that have large interests — likewise, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom within the FPDA framework. FPDA has provided instruments for the three countries to be involved in security dynamics in Southeast Asia. Within FPDA itself, Australia is a very active country as an external party in carrying out its role in the Southeast Asian region. It can not be separated from the interests of Australia, namely the safety of navigation in the sea communication lanes that cross the Strait of Malacca and Singapore (Emmers, 2012). Besides, Australia's involvement in joint exercises is also a form to enhance strategic relations with countries in Southeast Asia in the field of security through its two partners, Malaysia, and Singapore. Thayer believes that FPDA is a long-term commitment to building regional capacity and is an integral part of Australia's engagement strategy in Southeast Asia (Thayer, 2012).

FPDA was also used by the British to achieve their interests which included opportunities to continue defense diplomacy and demonstrate the ability of the military to support British interests, including arms sales (Thayer, 2007). For New Zealand, FPDA is a means of maintaining its security involvement with Southeast Asia and in complex exercise and providing armed forces. In the 2010 New Zealand White Paper, FPDA was identified as New Zealand's most significant security operational relationship and made Southeast Asia their defense asset (New Zealand Ministry of Defense, 2010). These interests show that FPDA can be a way for countries outside the region to engage in security in Southeast Asia. By establishing good relations with countries in Southeast Asia carried out through two partner countries, namely Malaysia and Singapore, it will simultaneously increase Confidence Building Measures for Britain, Australia, and New Zealand to avoid conflict. Thus, the presence of FPDA, even though it involves external forces, must still guarantee security stability in Southeast Asia Region.

CONCLUSION

The Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) is a security agency formed in 1971, initially aimed at providing security for Malaysia and Singapore over Indonesia's confrontational actions. In its arrangement, FPDA emphasized that concerning the external defenses of Malaysia and Singapore, if there were armed

attacks or threats against Malaysia and Singapore, the countries should consult together to determine what actions should be taken. As such, FPDA is not an alliance but a security institution. In its development, FPDA still exists today. The existence of FPDA lasts for five decades because FPDA continues to adapt the framework to the strategic environmental conditions in the region. Thus, the FPDA framework was also held to respond to contemporary security issues, especially non-traditional issues that cover the issues of terrorism, maritime security, transnational crime, piracy, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. FPDA, in its implementation, has been able to have a role in defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

Based on the principles of strategic engagement, countries need a framework of military cooperation to create mutual trust and transparency and form a common perception of shared interests. In this case, FPDA has carried out a strategic engagement function in the Southeast Asian region. First, FPDA has conducted joint military exercises, namely Bersama Lima and Bersama Shield. The military training was held to respond to non-traditional security issues that could pose a threat to stability in the region. By holding joint exercises, member states have increased commitment and interoperability in creating a climate of peace in the region. FPDA shows a commitment to transparency and building mutual trust by making other ASEAN countries as observers in every military exercise.

Second, FPDA carries out the strategic engagement function through regional forums in ASEAN. FPDA can be a complement to ADMM and ADMM Plus, which is a dialogue of security cooperation in ASEAN countries and also outside ASEAN for non-traditional security issues. FPDA is also a complement to The Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) which is a naval patrol and coordination involving Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to improve maritime security in the Malacca Strait. By being a complement to ASEAN, the role of FPDA can be seen from the arrangements that are not applied to the mechanism in ASEAN. Thus FPDA can carry out the role of strategic engagement to the maximum. Besides, strategic engagement also allows Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand as external forces to achieve their interests. The importance of being emphasized is establishing strategic partnerships through defense diplomacy in maintaining engagement commitments with countries in Southeast Asia to avoid long-term conflict.

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